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L Introduction
Over two hundred years ago, William Blackstone began his famous
Commentaries on property by observing that "[tlhere is nothing which so
generally strikes the imagination, and engages the affection of mankind, as
the right of property."' Blackstone's'desire for wealth should not surprise
us. Etymology tells us that money is a woman. Our word "money" derives
from Juno Moneta. Juno, queen of the gods, was the Roman goddess of
Womanhood, the personification of the feminine. Her title "Moneta" means
She Who Reminds and Warns. 2 The word "money" tells us that the feminine
is a reminder - a warning. This reflects the Hegelian insistence not only
that the market is fundamentally erotic, but that market relations are the most
basic and primitive form of eroticism. It also echoes the Lacanian under-
standing that the feminine is the primal commodity.'
My work as a lawyer and a legal scholar is an encounter with Hegelian
and Lacanian theory. I posit that property - the law of the market place -
and the feminine are both phallic. They serve parallel functions in the crea-
tion of subjectivity (i.e., the capability of being both a legal actor who can
bear rights and assume duties as well as a sexed being who can speak and
engage in social relations). In both theories, subjectivity is intersubjectivity
mediated by objectivity. Property, according to Hegelian philosophy, and
the feminine, according to Lacanian psychoanalysis, are fictions that serve
as the defining external objects that enable us to make ourselves into acting
subjects. By serving as objects of exchange between subjects, property and
the feminine simultaneously enable subjects to recognize other humans as
individual subjects - as the mediators of relationship, they enable us to
desire and be desired. This creation of subjectivity is simultaneously the
1. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 2 (A.W.
Brian Simpson ed., 1979).
2. OXFORD ENGLISH DICrIoNARY 992 (9th ed. 1989). Another theory is that her
surname might have been the Roman translation of the Greek title which meant "Mother of
the Muses."
3. The etymology is evocative. Juno's title as the Reminder and Warner seems to have
related specifically to her role as counselor to those considering marriage. THE NEW
LAROUSSE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MYTHOLOGY 204 (F. Giraud ed., R. Aldington & D. Ames
trans., 1968). It also reflects her more general role as guardian of Rome. For example, it
was the cackling of her sacred geese kept at the temple of Juno Moneta that woke the sleeping
Romans, enabling them to fight off a surprise night raid by the Gauls. Id. Typically,
however, the mechanism by which the word was transmitted is mundane. The ancient Romans
coined their money in the temple of Juno Moneta. Our word "mint" is also a corruption of
the temple's name. Money is that which was made in the temple. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIO-
NARY, supra note 2, at 992.
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creation of the realm which Lacan called the symbolic: law, language and
sexuality. I will explain my terminology in more detail shortly.
Lacan interests me as a feminist because he simultaneously divorced
sexuality from anatomy while explaining how sexuality is not only confused
with, but figured by, anatomy. By reading Lacan together with Hegelian
property jurisprudence, I show how property and markets are erotic and,
therefore, are also figured in legal discourse by bodily metaphors.
My theory is a thorough-going reconstruction of both feminist and
property theory. I believe my theory gives a more complex and faithful
account of sexual difference than do either of the two dominant schools of
legal feminism - cultural feminism and so-called radical feminism - which
are simple negations or mirror images of masculinism reflecting back tradi-
tional gender stereotypes. That is, both implicitly accept the American
imagery of masculinity as atomistic individuality and femininity as the
opposite or complement of masculinity. The primary difference is that
cultural feminists embrace the resulting vision of femininity as authentic,
while radical feminists reject it as the abased condition of women imposed
upon us by men in patriarchal society.
My theory also helps to explain why we as a society tenaciously cling
to certain property law doctrines despite their disutility and stubbornly
continue to maintain certain legal theories despite overwhelming empirical
evidence to the contrary. This article is intended for attorneys as well as
jurisprudes and critical theorists, although different aspects will no doubt
appeal to different segments of my audience. I believe that my theory is not
merely of theoretical interest. I have personally found that my approach has
been extremely useful not only in my teaching but also in my doctrinal
scholarship and in my legal practice as a commercial lawyer.
Readers of my doctrinal scholarship, as well as lawyers with whom I
practice, are often surprised that I see an intimate connection between the
work and my admittedly outr6 theorizing. Let me try to explain. Hegelian-
Lacanian theory is an account not only of the structure of law, but of the
unconscious thinking processes which underlay our conscious legal thinking.
Think of a compass. A compass can not only help me locate my position
when I know I'm lost, it can also occasionally reveal that I am actually
heading in a different direction from which I thought. Once my position is
located and my direction is reoriented, however, there is no immediate use
for the compass; I can safely put it away temporarily and use other markers
to continue my journey. If I were to write a travelogue, a reader could
appreciate the resulting description of the my ultimate destination even if she
does not know how I got there. She could not retrace the route and repro-
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duce the trip - nor successfully engage in a new but similar journey -
without this information, however.
Similarly, I believe that Hegelian-Lacanian theory helps us not only to
determine what is wrong with legal theories or doctrines that we intuit are
faulty (such as, in my case, the so-called "bundle of sticks" theory of prop-
erty), but also to re-evaluate and critique theories and doctrines to which we
cling because they are so intuitively attractive despite empirical evidence to
the contrary (such as the commercial law doctrine of ostensible ownership).
Most recently, I have been applying my analysis to a number of so-called
"law and economic" doctrines, such as the Calabresi and Melamed taxonomy
of environmental dispute regimes and the concept of the "perfect" market.
Hegelian-Lacanian theory helps us do this by revealing the unacknowledged,
unconscious but implicit assumptions, metaphors, and imagery - similar to
what Thomas Kunlm would call paradigms - underlying the law. Once this
initial analysis is completed, psychoanalysis, like a compass, can be tempo-
rarily put away in favor of the familiar conscious thought process of tradi-
tional legal analysis. Consequently, the lawyer reading my doctrinal analy-
sis, like the reader of my travelogue, may appreciate my ultimate legal
analysis even if he does not know or understand the path that led me there.
But, he could not fully understand, reproduce or critique my analysis, nor
engage in similar analysis or critique, without this information. Let me
explain in greater detail.
I see myself as first and last a lawyer writing about law, not a philoso-
pher. I had a successful practice as a finance lawyer in New York City for
twelve years prior to entering academia and continue to consult in commer-
cial litigation. Although much of my scholarship consists of highly abstract
jurisprudential theory, I also write highly technical, commercial law articles
for the practicing attorney and consult on lawsuits as an expert on Article 8
of the Uniform Commercial Code. This work is intimately related to my
developing jurisprudential theory. That is, I do not view myself as a Lacan-
ian academic who happens to apply her theory to law. Rather, I am a lawyer
who turned to Lacan and Hegel in order better to understand and practice
law.
In my opinion, law to a large part is a subset of rhetoric. By this I do
not mean that it is contentless cant, or am I cynically accusing lawyers of
being sophists or prostitutes, who can and will say anything for a buck.
Rather, I mean that law is social; it governs relationships between and
among people and, therefore, must be communicated to function. As such,
law only exists in its expression - whether in statute, opinion, argument or
contract. Law's content, therefore, is inextricably linked to its form. Con-
sequently, I believe that understanding the symbolic order of language can
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greatly enhance our understanding of both the symbolic order of law as well
as lawyering.
It has become a banal cliche to claim that self-hood is socially con-
structed. Probably no expression has become so shop-worn and meaningless
so fast. Indeed, Lacanian theorist Slavoj 2iiek slights social construction
theory as "the typical vulgar misunderstanding of Lacan. '"4 Nevertheless, I
believe that in our postmodern economy it is increasingly true that we define
our personality in terms of legal rights and responsibilities (legal subjectiv-
ity). This can perhaps be most graphically seen in the civil rights, women's
rights, and more recently disabled rights and gay rights movements, where
the claims of a group for social recognition and equality have been largely
played out (as the common terminology suggests) in terms of claims for legal
rights. This is even more true in so-called "private" law (i.e., contract,
property, commercial law, etc.), which interests me because it is the law of
everyday life. Private law governs our relationships with almost all people
other than our casual friends - such as our employers, coworkers, students,
landlords, and shopkeepers to name a few - where legal rights increasingly
replace status. Even (or especially) our family relationships have important
legal and economic, as well as emotive and cultural, components. My
relationship to my husband as a wife overlaps with, but is not the same as,
my relationship with him as lover or friend. At least in our society, law and
personality are, therefore, intimately, if not inextricably, interconnected.
This suggests both that the study of personality (psychoanalysis) should
enrich our understanding of law, and that the study of law should enrich our
understanding of personality.
Specifically, as a practicing lawyer, I had long been troubled by the
inadequacies of the law of intangible property, most specifically the law
governing security interests in investment securities. I was particularly
troubled by the continued use of what seemed to me inappropriate and
unsuccessful analogies to physical relations with tangible property. And yet
I could simultaneously neither account for the use of such analogies nor
imagine any other way of thinking about intangibles. Indeed, the very term
"intangibles" indicates how hard it is to think of intangibility, except in terms
of tangibility. It is this precise problem that led me to seek a different way
to analyze the structure of property law, specifically, and legal thinking,
generally.
In addition, when I graduated law school in 1978, it was quite uncom-
mon for women to practice finance law. I found that although I was skilled
in understanding conventional legal analysis, I seemed to have a talent for
4. Conversation with Slavoj 2itek (Spring 1997).
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formulating novel modes of analysis, lines of arguments, and structures for
transactions. Although I would have liked to attribute this to my own
individual creativity, I believed that something more was going on. As a
feminist, I was interested in the role of women lawyers and how this was
affected by actual or illusory gender and sexual differences. I believed that
I was perceiving a marked empirical difference in the type of imagery and
metaphors which I and the few other women lawyers I knew tended to find,
at least initially, appropriate to describe a legal problem on the one hand,
and those initiated by my male colleagues on the other. This is not to
suggest that male and female lawyers could or did not understand each other
after a discussion. Indeed, our success as lawyers shows the contrary. But,
I observed that male and female lawyers would often join a discussion from
different starting places. This led me to suspect that the problem of legal
imagery and metaphors with which I had been struggling might also be
related to sexuality. This seemed consistent with my other underlying
assumptions that law is rhetorical in nature, and personality is in large part
legal subjectivity.
That women and men tend to speak differently as an empirical matter
is a phenomenon widely recognized among linguists, although there is
substantial disagreement as to the essential nature of these differences, let
alone their cause. Nevertheless, I perceived that the differences in masculine
and feminine legal rhetoric did not follow traditional sexual stereotypes such
as the cliche embraced by "different voice" feminists, that women think
more in terms of relationship and men more in terms of individual rights.
I believe that traditional finance law (i.e., as practiced primarily by men) is
intensely and expressly concerned with building and maintaining relation-
ships of the type celebrated by different voice feminism. (Indeed, in my
analysis, it is the dream of immediate relationship which characterizes the
masculine imaginary.) I also observed that a large percentage of women
finance lawyers were intensely individualistic, competitive, and self-in-
volved.
After several years, my interest in feminism led me to explore Lacanian
theory. At around the same time, my interest in property led me to read
Hegel. Eventually, I began developing my theory of the legal nature of
sexuality and the erotics of property.
-Law is a practice as well as a theory, which is why I find it such an
intensely fascinating field. As the cliche goes, the proof of the pudding is
in the eating. Consequently, I have set about the task of applying my
analysis to a large number of property issues. Many of these applications
which I have completed to date have been published in law reviews and will
appear in a book I have written which will be published within the next year.
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I have also incorporated other applications in my practice as an expert in the
law of investment securities and have recently begun a new long term project
of applying my analysis to law and economic theory. If the reader finds my
analysis of specific legal questions covered in my work to be insightful,
then this is some evidence (but, of course, not proof) of the validity of my
approach.
As is obvious from my introductory paragraph, I tend to make use of
mythology and classical allusions, word play, and true and folk etymologies.
This is relatively unusual in jurisprudential writings. I fear this might be off-
putting to some lawyers and that I may be accused, as Hegel sometimes is,
of confusing puns with analysis, finding too much significance in purely
accidental and inconsequential similarities between words and images. This
accusation misses the point that in Iegelian and Lacanian theory; subjectiv-
ity, law, and language are considered to be mutually constituting. The
structure of language, therefore, should be expected to reflect the uncon-
scious structure of law and personality. As a result, the similarities identi-
fied in word play and humor may not be merely accidental in the sense of
random. They may be serendipitous - unexpected but happy revelations of
hidden connections between ideas and words.
II. Hegelian Property and Lacanian Sexuality
A. Hegel
From a Hegelian-Lacanian perspective, property and the law are desper-
ately erotic - indeed, hysterically so in the technical sense of the word.
Hegelian theory is often misunderstood by Americans because it parts
company with the political and jurisprudential tradition predominant in this
country - i.e., the various Enlightenment philosophies generally grouped
under the umbrella "classical liberalism" - which takes as its starting place
the concept of the state of nature as the free, autonomous individual endowed
with natural rights.5 In contradistinction, to both Hegel and Lacan, "subjec-
tivity" - the capacity to speak and bear legal rights - is not a pre-existing,
natural status.
In my reading, Hegelian thought is not, however, antiliberal, but extra-
liberal. 6 Hegel agreed with liberalism that freedom is the essence of human
5. I refer, of course, to the philosophical term "classical liberalism" and not the
colloquial terminology of "political liberalism." The vast majority of political conservatives
in this country are classical liberals. For example, both libertarianism and utilitarianism are
forms of classical liberalism.
6. I place myself in the "leftist" tradition of Hegelian scholarship, which emphasizes
the concepts of individual freedom and liberty within the state. A rival "rightist" tradition
exists as well, which emphasizes the state over the individual.
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nature and no state could be called just which did not preserve individual
liberty. Hegel thought, however, that the liberal individual is too empty and
fragile a concept to be a "subject" (i.e., to be capable of legal rights or
language). Freedom can only be abstract and potential in the state of nature.
The question to Hegel (and to feminists) is how to make freedom concrete
and actual in human life.
According to Hegel, classical liberal thought is internally inconsistent
with respect to the concepts of individuality and rights. As Wesley New-
comb Hohfeld reminds us, rights can only be understood as relationships
between and among people.7 Similarly, language can only be understood in
terms of society. Consequently, the autonomous individual in the state of
nature can neither speak nor bear legal rights as liberalism claims. The
freedom that is human potential can only become actual through social
relationships!
Subjectivity does not, and cannot, pre-exist society, therefore, but can
only be achieved within society. To put this in theological terms, the subject
is not a being - something that pre-exists - but a creature - something that
is created. The subject is not natural in the liberal sense, but artificial. To
say it is "artificial," however, in no way implies that it is not "actual" or that
it is inauthentic. Artificial means, literally, "made by art." Nothing could
be more authentic to man than the artist. If subjectivity is a fiction, it is the
fiction in which we live.
Because Hegel argued that the abstract person posited by liberalism is
driven to make his potential freedom actual, the person passionately desires
to enter into social relations and achieve first subjectivity and then higher
states of human consciousness. 9 To Hegel, the logically most primitive, first
7. Hohfeld's system of relational legal conceptions organized in pairs jural opposites
and correlatives is collected as WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CON-
CEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN LEGAL REASONING (W. Cook ed., 1919).
8. See G.W.F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 35 (Allen W. Wood
ed., H.B. Nisbet trans., 1991) ("[The system of right [i.e., property, contract, law] is the
realm of actualized freedom."). This is one of the meanings of Hegel's (wrongly) notorious
assertion that "[w]hat is rational is actual; and what is actual is rational." Id. at 20. I discuss
the Hegelian concepts of potentiality and actuality in JEANNE LORRAINE SCHROEDER, THE
VESTAL AND THE FASCES: HEGEL, LACAN, PROPERTY AND THE FEMININE (forthcoming
1998). See also Jeanne L. Schroeder, Never Jam To-day: On the Impossibility of Takings
Jurisprudence, 85 GEO. L. J. 1531, 1559-61 (1996).
9. As Michel Rosenfeld has put it:
The struggle for recognition is part of the dialectic of self-consciousness. Self-
consciousness for Hegel is desire....
Indeed, once it is understood that the aim of desire is the preservation of self-
consciousness, then it seems logical to conclude, as Hegel does, that self-con-
sciousness can only achieve satisfaction in another self-consciousness. If desire
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step in the process of actualizing freedom is the regime of law (abstract
right) in the sense of property and contract. Property does not exist to
satisfy the physical needs or sensuous longings of human beings. Rather, we
create property in order to fulfill our insatiable desire for self-actualization.
Although property law can govern physical relations between owner and
tangible objects (among other things), it cannot be reduced to such relations.
For example, the owner of an apple has the right to possess the apple and eat
it. But these rights are distinguishable from the sensuous experience of
touching, tasting, and digesting it. In Lacanian terminology, property is
symbolic, not real.
Specifically, Hegel believed that a person can attain subjectivity only by
being recognized as a worthy human being by another worthy human
being.' The abstract person in the state of nature, having no social relations
is unrecognizable. That is, each abstract person (i.e., the atomistic individ-
ual of liberalism) is indistinguishable from any other. The person, therefore,
needs to take on individuating characteristics. In philosophical terminology,
anything other than the subject is an object. The word object includes not
merely tangible things, such as land or cattle, but intangibles, such as rights
to payment and intellectual property, as well as everything that makes us
individuals - our bodies, our beliefs, and our personalities."
seeks to maintain identity, then self-consciousness must seek an object which
provides it with recognition. And the only object which can provide sustained
recognition to a self-consciousness is another self-consciousness.
Michel Rosenfeld, Hegel and the Dialectics of Contract, 10 CARDOZO L. REv. 1199, 1220-21
(1989).
In THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, see generally HEGEL, supra note 8, Hegel starts with an
introductory consideration of the Kantian concept of the abstract free person as the most basic
notion of human nature and shows in subsequent chapters how this abstract person is driven,
first, to achieve subjectivity in the realm of right and, eventually, to become an individual of
a modem constitutional state in the realm of ethical life.
Let me at this point very quickly digress and point out another way Hegelian philosophy
departs from many versions of liberalism. To oversimplify, in liberalism legal subjectivity -
the ability to bear legal rights and to participate in the market regime of property and
contract - roughly equates to individual freedom. To the Hegelian, subjectivity (and the
capitalist market regime) amounts only to the most primitive actualization of individual
freedom. Thus, although a necessary aspect of human freedom, subjectivity is only the most
abstract and inadequate version of freedom. Consequently, subjectivity is one necessary
aspect of human nature, but not the be all and end all of human capacity.
10. See Rosenfeld, supra note 9, at 1220-21. "Property is... to Hegel a moment in
man's struggle for recognition." SHLOMO AVINERM, HEGEL'S THEORY OF THE MODERN STATE
89 (1972).
11. Anything that "can be conceived as immediately different from free personality" can
be an "object" of property. Peter Benson, Abstract Right and the Possibility of a Nondis-
tributive Conception of Contract: Hegel and Contemporary Contract Theory, 10 CARDOZO L.
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To be recognized by other subjects and have interrelationships, a person
must form object relations (i.e., take on specific recognizable characteris-
tics). Property is the most primitive form of interrelationship from a logical
matter. (Note, I did not say historical or biographical - modem property
rights and capitalistic markets are relatively modem inventions.) 12 In prop-
erty, subjects mutually recognize each other through a regime of possession,
enjoyment, and alienation of a desired mediating object. 3 Consequently, I
have defined the Hegelian conception of subjectivity as intersubjectivity
mediated by objectivity. 4 Property is a necessary moment in man's un-
quenchable search for recognition by others. Property is therefore desper-
ately erotic. We seek to acquire property not for its own sake, but deriva-
tively, in order to achieve our true desire, the desire of the Other.
Hegelian jurisprudence differs from conventional liberal jurisprudence
in other ways as well. The traditional American understanding of the legal
world is closed and complementary. In the words of Frank Michelman and
REV. 1077, 1164 (1989).
Intellectual... accomplishments, sciences, arts, even religious observances (such
as sermons, masses, prayers, and blessings at consecrations), inventions, and the
like, become objects... of contract; in the way they are bought and sold, etc.,
they are treated as equivalent to acknowledged things.
HEGEL, supra note 8, at 74.
Anything, capacity or activity 'external' to the person, can become an object of
property. Externality does not mean simply that the thing is physically distinct
from the person. Objects like books, works of art and mechanical invention are
external to the person, not in virtue of being physically distinct from him, but in
virtue of being objectifications (Entdusserungen), i.e. concrete embodiments of
human skills, talents and abilities.
Seyla Benhabib, Obligation, Contract and Exchange: On the Significance of Hegel's Abstract
Right, in THE STATE & CivIL SOCIETY: STUDIES IN HEGEL'S POLMCAL PHILOSOPHY 159, 163
(Z.A. Pelczynski ed., 1984).
12. Consequently, the dialectic of property constitutes the first part of the PHILOSOPHY
OF RIGHT, see generally HEGEL, supra note 8, and precedes Hegel's discussion of the family,
civil society, and the state. By primitive, Hegel makes a logical, not an empirical point. The
development of the liberal state (necessary for the actualization of freedom) did not even begin
until the late eighteenth century precisely because the logically first requirement of subjectivity
(private property) was empirically late to develop. Critiques of Hegel frequently miss this
point. For example, as I discuss in Jeanne Lorraine Schroeder, Virgin Territory: Margaret
Radin's Imagery of Personal Property as the Inviolate Feminine Body, 79 MINN. L. REV. 55,
114-51 (1994), Margaret Radin misinterprets Hegel's dialectic of propeity as though he was
trying to describe the empirical process by which human beings become mature adults through
object relations.
13. See HEGEL, supra note 8, at 84-103; SCHROEDER, supra note 8; Schroeder, supra
note 8, at 1535-44; Schroeder, supra note 12, at 55, 133-40.
14. See SCHROEDER, supra note 8; Schroeder, supra note 12, at 58.
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Duncan Kennedy, it is governed by a law of conservation of legal expo-
sures." That is, to oversimplify Hohfeld's classic formulation, every legal
entitlement must be precisely balanced by an equivalent obligation (or
obligations) imposed upon other the person (or persons). A Hohfeldian
would say that when we claim a right for ourselves, we necessarily impose
duties upon others, and that we recognize rights of others because we are
under legal duties to do so. Using Lacanian terminology, this vision of a
closed world, where subjects have perfectly complementary, mirror image
rights and duties, is imaginary.16 In the imaginary, meaning is stable. In the
imaginary, as in cultural and radical feminism, the masculine and the femi-
nine are either opposites or complements.
In contradistinction, Hegel's conception of law is symbolic. Law is
open and expanding. Legal signification, unlike imaginary meaning, is a
process of slippage and movement. We neither claim rights for ourselves,
nor do we recognize rights of others out of duties imposed upon us. Rather,
we are engaged in an ongoing process of legal creation. We grant rights to
others out of love.17 A claim to a right - a relationship between and among
legal subjects - can be actualized only if recognized and respected by other
subjects. One can only become a subject by being recognized as such by
another subject. Consequently, to become a subject, an abstract person (i.e.,
the individual posited by liberalism) must first seek to make another abstract
15. Duncan Kennedy & Frank Michelman, Are Property and Contract Efficient?, 8
HoFsTRA L. REv. 711, 759 (1980).
16. SCHROEDER, supra note 8. The imaginary is the least worked out of the Lacan-
ian orders. Like all great thinkers, Lacan refined his theories constantly throughout his life.
In his early work, Lacan concentrated on the distinction between the symbolic and the
imaginary. In his late work, however, Lacan had changed his concentration to the distinction
between the symbolic and the real, with the real taking over some of the function which had
originally been ascribed to the imaginary. Compare, e.g., JACQUES LACAN, THE SEMINAR
OF JACQUES LACAN BOOK I FREUD'S PAPERS ON TECHNIQUE 80 (J.A. Miller ed., J. Forrester
trans., 1988) [hereinafter LACAN, SEMINAR 1], with Jacques Lacan, God and the Jouissance
of the Woman [hereinafter Lacan, Jouissance], in FEMININE SEXUATfY: JACQUES LACAN AND
THE tCOLE FREUDIENNE 127 (uliet Mitchell & Jacqueline Rose eds., Jacqueline Rose trans.,
1985) (translating portions of Lacan's twentieth seminar, ENCORE) [hereinafter FEMININE
SExuALrrY], and Jacques Lacan, A Love Letter (Une Lettre d'Amour), in FEM-
ININE SEXUALrrY, supra, at 149. See also SLAVOJ 22EK, THE SUBLIME OBJECT OF
IDEOLOGY 162 (1989) ("With the development of Lacanian teaching in the sixties and seven-
ties, what he calls 'the Real' approaches more and more what he called, in the fifties, the
Imaginary"). Consequently, it is not absolutely clear what functions were left to the imaginary
in the late Lacan. Because my theories are based largely on the late Lacanian theories of
feminine sexuality, and the works of Slavoj 2iek, this Article reflects this change of emphasis
to the real.
17. Arthur J. Jacobson, Hegel's Legal Plenum, in HEGEL AND LEGAL THEORY 97, 110
(Drucilla Cornell et al. eds., 1991).
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person into a subject. This is an act of creation; love is alchemy. Love is
the desire to be desired (to be recognized)."8 The lover is not like the U.S.
Army which is satisfied if you be all that you can be. The lover requires the
beloved to become more in the hope that she might love him back and make
him her equal. To love someone is to see in the beloved more than she is.
This can have the magic effect of enabling her to give back more than she
had.19 The Hegelian legal universe, like the heart, has the capacity for
infinite expansion as we lavish our love and grant more and more rights to
others.
The Hegelian rights of property are possession, enjoyment, and alien-
ation, understood in the most broad and abstract terms. Possession is the
taking on of identifying characteristics by identifying an object to a specific
subject who can exclude others from the object. Enjoyment is the expression
of one's freedom (in the sense of sovereignty over the object) through the
exploitation of the object. Alienation is the expression of one's freedom (in
the sense of separate existence from and indifference to any specific object)
by severing one's relation to the object.
The property right of possession is not the empirical fact that I seek to
acquire objects in order to make myself recognizable. Rather, it is my
recognition that the other has the right to possess and to exclude me from
objects so that she can attain unique distinguishing characteristics. Similarly,
the property of enjoyment is not an empirical expression of my freedom in
enjoying my objects. It is my recognition that the other has the right to
actualize her freedom by enjoying her objects, even when her enjoyment
necessarily impinges on mine. Finally, the right to alienation is not the
empirical fact that I can abandon an object, or give it to the other. Rather,
alienation only truly becomes actualized when I exchange an object with
another in contract. It is only at this juncture of the market that I finally
meet the other as an equal and obtain legal subjectivity. In contract I do not
merely recognize the other's rights of possession, enjoyment, and alienation,
but, by agreeing to contract with me, the other person in turn grants me the
same rights. Paradoxically, it is only at this moment, when we are joined
in a common shared act of will, that we can now recognize each other as
unique. This is yet another example of the doctrine of the identity of identity
and difference which underlies the entire Hegelian dialectic.
18. "To love is, essentially, the wish to be loved." JACQUES LACAN, THE FouR
FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS 253 (J. Miller ed. & A. Sheridan trans.,
1981).
19. Miran Botovid, The Bond of Love: Lacan and Spinoza, 23 FORMATIONS 69, 69
(1994).
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The corollary to the theory that the legal universe is expanding because
we are involved in a constant act of legal creation is that the subject is never
complete. If we were complete, we could not grow, create, or love. To
Hegel, freedom requires a moment of absence of restraints, boundaries, and
content. If freedom is the essence of human nature, then negativity is the
heart and sole of subjectivity." This concept of radical essential negativity
is equivalent to the Lacanian feminine. 2
B. From Hegel to Lacan
Lacan, who was deeply influenced by Hegel, thought that psychic
subjectivity - the ability to become a speaking actor capable of love - is
artificial. Like legal subjectivity, psychic subjectivity is intersubjectivity
mediated by objectivity. It is created through a regime of possession,
enjoyment, and alienation of the object of desire among subjects. As I shall
explain, the technical term for this object is the "phallus."'
Lacan explained how sexuality is created by the imaginary identification
of the symbolic concept of the phallus with seemingly real biological
analogs - the male organ and the female body. I argue that a parallel
conflation occurs in jurisprudence and legal doctrine - the symbolic or legal
concept of property is described through elaborate metaphors of the penis
and the virgin. This is an intuition or "abduction" which comes to us so
easily as to seem natural. Indeed as a psychoanalytic matter, we may not be
capable of speaking about property without resorting to phallic concepts.
What do I mean by sexuality and phallic metaphors?'
20. See HEGEL, supra note 8, at 37-39.
21. See generally SCHROEDER, supra note 8.
22. See Jacques Lacan, The Signification of the Phallus, in JACQUES LACAN, P.CRITS:
A SELECTION 281 (Alan Sheridan trans., 1977); see also Juliet Mitchell, Introduction I to
FEMININE SEXUALITY, supra note 16, at 1, 38-40; ELIZABETH GROSz, JACQUES LACAN: A
FEMINIST INTRODUCTION 116-26 (1990).
23. I must point out one apparent difference between the Hegelian regime of property
and the Hegelian regime of sexuality. In Hegel's system, every subject takes on all positions
with respect to the object of desire. Each subject possesses, enjoys and engages in alienation
through exchange of the object of property. According to Lacan, it is impossible for any
person to achieve all these necessary positions at one time. Either he takes on the masculine
positions of possessing (having) and exchanging the phallic object of desire, or of identifying
with (being) and enjoying the phallic object of desire. There is a fundamental failure, there-
fore, at the heart of Lacanian subjectivity. (As an aside, one should not assume from this that
the Hegelian person is full and complete. As I have mentioned, the heart of the Hegelian
person represents pure negativity. The failure of integration of personality in Hegel is a
complex, subtle idea which lies beyond the limited purposes of this Article, however. See
infra text accompanying notes 31-35.)
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C. Lacan
1. Sexuality as the Response to Loss
Lacan said that subjects are split.'" As in Hegel, the proposition that
subjectivity can only be achieved through the social (i.e., through law and
language) creates a paradox. That which is most ourselves - our subjectiv-
ity, our sexuality - is simultaneously that which comes from the outside, it
is that which is not ourselves. As we mature and are initiated into language
and law and achieve sexuality, we first experience the sense that we have
lost something which we can no longer explain in words or images. This
sense that our wholeness is lost and that this loss has been imposed upon us
by something outside of us is what Lacan calls "castration."2' Castration is
the universal initiation right of subjectivity. We feel that we must have once
been an object which is now lost because "someone" has taken it away.
Lacan calls the object which we feel has been lost in castration, of course,
the phallus. This is another Lacanian paradox; the object that is necessary
for the creation subjectivity is experienced as being lost. The loss of the
phallus as object of desire creates desire, or desire creates the idea that there
must have once been a phallic object of desire that it now lost.
24. See, e.g., GRosz, supra note 22, at 137.
25. Castration is the loss of the mythical object of desire (the "Phallus" - the symbol
of subjectivity). JACQUES LACAN, The Ecole Freudienne, the Phallic Phase and the Subjective
Import of the Castration Complex, in FEMININE SEXUALrY, supra note 16, at 99, 116-17;
Jacques Lacan, The Direction of Treatment and Principles of Its Power, in JACQUES LACAN,
icrITs: A SELECTION 226, 265 (Alan Sheridan trans., 1977).
Castration is not any natural (real) loss as object relations psychologists have wrongly
concluded. It is, rather, the moment our sense of loss acquires sexual signification.
There is a fundamental distinction between recognizing that the castration complex
may refer back to other separations and technically seeing these separations as
castrations.... Freud's [i.e. Lacan's interpretation of the non-naturalistic side of
Freud] account is retroactive: fearing phallic castration the child may "recollect"
previous losses, castration gives them relevance.... For Freud, history and the
psychoanalytic experience is always a reconstruction, a retrospective account.
Mitchell, supra note 22, at 18-19. In Lacan's words,
The fear of castration is like a thread that perforates all the stages of development.
It orientates the relations that are anterior to its actual appearance - weaning,
toilet training, etc. It crystallizes each of these moments in a dialectic that has as
its center a bad encounter. If the stages are consistent, it is in accordance with
their possible registration in terms of bad encounters. The central bad encounter
is at the level of the sexual.
LAcAN, supra note 18, at 64. I discuss castration and the concept of sexuality as the response
to castration infra in text accompanying notes 25-27.
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This phallic terminology reflects Lacan's theory that sexuality is our
response to this sense of loss. Sexuality is, therefore, essential to subjectiv-
ity. The masculine and the feminine are not anatomical facts, but two
possible positions which one can take in our society with respect to the
universal experience of castration. We are "masculine" when we try to deny
castration and "feminine" when we accept castration. The masculine pre-
tends that he has and exchanges the lost phallus. In contradistinction, by
recognizing that loss, emptiness, and negativity are the at the center of
human experience, the feminine identifies with the lost phallus and is posi-
tioned as lack. By doing so, the feminine becomes identified with radical
negativity which is necessary for Hegelian freedom. Sexuality is not anat-
omy; all humans assume both positions from time to time.
This is not a denial of the physical world nor of biological sexuality.
It is an acknowledgment that conscious beings can never have direct access
to our biology. The instant that we speak or envision our sexuality, we are
already interpreting it through the orders of the imaginary and the symbolic.
Consequently, according to Lacan, one cannot distinguish biological "sexual-
ity" from social "gender." "Sexuality" is always already socialized -
symbolic.
Nevertheless, this purely "symbolic" concept of sexuality - like the
purely symbolic concept of property - becomes mapped upon or "figured"
by anatomy.' We will confuse sexuality with biology and use biological
26. "[Alnatomy is what figures in the account: 'for me "anatomy is not destiny", but that
does not mean that anatomy does not "figure"' . . . , but it only figures (it is a sham)."
Jacqueline Rose, Introduction II to FEMININE SEXUALITY, supra note 16, at 27, 44 (citations
omitted). These positions are only generally associated with the biological sexes.
This account of sexual desire led Lacan, as it led Freud, to his adamant rejection
of any theory of the difference between the sexes in terms of pre-given male or
female entities which complete and satisfy each other. Sexual difference can only
be the consequence of a division; without this division it would cease to exist. But
it must exist because no human being can become a subject outside the division into
two sexes. One must take up a position as either a man or a woman. Such a
position is by no means identical with one's biological sexual characteristics, nor
is it a position of which one can be very confident - as the psychoanalytical
experience demonstrates.
Mitchell, supra note 22, at 6. That is:
For Lacan, men and women are only ever in language ('Men and women are
signifiers bound to the common usage of language',.. .). All speaking beings
must line themselves up on one side or the other of this division, but anyone can
cross over and inscribe themselves on the opposite side from that to which they are
anatomically destined.
Rose, supra, at 49.
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imagery to describe sexuality. As a result, biological male persons are more
likely to take on the masculine position and biologically female persons, the
feminine.
At first blush, Lacan's terminology seems to privilege the masculine.
Accordingly, Lacan's theory is often condemned by feminists as misogynist.
I think this is incorrect. I believe that instead of being a misogynist theory,
it is a theory of misogyny. The terminology does not posit essential mascu-
line superiority. It reflects the fact that Western society is patriarchal and
misogynist as an empirical matter. Rather than supporting the sexual status
quo, however, Lacanian theory undermines it from within.
2. The Three Orders of Subjectivity
In order to follow the Lacanian dialectic of sexuality, it is helpful to stop
and consider the terminology in more detail here since I will return to these
terms later in the discussion of the efficient market at the end of this Article.
I have already used the terminology "symbolic," "imaginary," and "real."
According to Lacan, these are the three psychic orders of consciousness. 27
The imaginary is the realm of imagery, fantasy, meaning, and complemen-
tarity. The symbolic is the cultural order of law and language, of significa-
tion and sexuality. The real is our sense that there is something beyond or
prior to the other two. The real is not the same as the natural world. Yet,
To say that Lacan sought to destroy any lingering biological determinism in Freud's
theories while explaining how gender difference becomes mapped upon biological sexual dif-
ference, see GROSZ, supra note 22, at 13; Drucilla Cornell, The Doubly-Prized World: Myth
Allegory and the Feminine, 75 CORN. L. REV. 644, 660 (1990), is not to imply that biological
sexual difference does not exist or is not important. Lacan's point is that our experience of
sexuality as speaking, conscious subjects can never be simply reduced to our biological sex
for the same reason that property cannot be reduced to our sensuous relationship with physical
things. Sexuality is artificial and therefore authentic to man the artist. The sexual status quo
is neither natural nor inevitable in the sense that anatomy is destiny. Nevertheless, Lacan
hypothesizes a mechanism by which a sexual status quo - once in place - is able to repro-
duce itself.
27. Jacqueline Rose states:
Lacan termed the order of language the symbolic, that of the ego and its identifica-
tions the imaginary (the stress, therefore, is quite deliberately on symbol and
image, the idea of something which 'stands in'). The real was then his term for
the moment of impossibility onto which both are grafted, the point of that mo-
ment's endless return.
Rose, supra note 26, at 31; see LACAN, SEMINAR I, supra note 16, at 80. In one of Lacan's
last seminars, he uses the metaphor of a "Borromean Knot" to describe the relationships
between these three orders. See STUART SCHNEIDERMAN, JACQUES LACAN: THE DEATH OF
AN INTELLECTUAL HERo 33 (1983).
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for many purposes it functions as though it were the natural world because
the real includes our sense that there is a natural world. (Consequently, for
the very limited purposes of this Article, I find it sufficient essentially to
oversimplify and use the word "real" as though it meant the natural or
anatomical.) The real, however, also includes such concepts as God and
death and everything else which is beyond ourselves. It includes the com-
mon frustration that one can not express one's feeling in words (the symbolic
order) or in pictures (the imaginary order).
The real is, therefore, impossible.2 We experience the real as though
it is something we have lost. It includes that which we feel we have lost in
castration - the false memory of completeness, for instance, of a oneness
with mother which we feel we must have experienced as an infant. This is
not really true because the real is necessarily created with the symbolic and
the real.
By this I mean that any system of law (signification, the symbolic) and
imagery (meaning, the imaginary) require boundaries. The real is the sense
that there is something on the other side of the boundaries. The order of the
real is, therefore, only established by the erection of the boundaries at the
moment of the creation of the imaginary and the symbolic.29 Castration is
the term for this process because we feel that it has deprived us of the real.
In fact, the real was only created by castration.
D. Sexuality as the Response to Castration
The two sexes are two positions one can take with respect to the univer-
sal condition of castration.
28. "The Real cannot be experienced as such: it is capable of representation or conceptu-
alization only through the reconstructive or inferential work of the imaginary and symbolic
orders. Lacan himself refers to the Real as 'the lack of a lack.'" GROSz, supra note 22, at
34. Grosz explains:
The child, in other words, is born into the order of the Real. The Real is the order
preceding the ego and the organization of the drives. It is an anatomical, 'natural'
order (nature in the sense of resistance rather than positive substance), a pure
plenitude or fullness .... The Real is not however the same as reality; reality is
lived as and known through imaginary and symbolic representations.
Id.
29. See generally SLAVOJ J2K, TARRYING WITH THE NEGATIVE: KANT, HEGEL, AND
THE CRrTIQUE OF IDEOLOGY 35-39 (1993); Jacques-Alain Miller, Microscopia: An Introduc-
tion to the Reading of Television, in JACQUES LAcAN, TELEVISION: A CHALLENGE TO THE
PSYCHOANALYTIC ESTABLISHMENT at xi, xxiv (Joan Copjec ed., Dennis Hollier et al. trans.,
1990).
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1. The Masculine
The masculine position is the vain attempt to deny the castration which
has already occurred. The masculine is not an attempt to achieve a sense of
wholeness, but a false claim to have "it," whatever "it" is that will fill up the
hole. This is done through simultaneously adopting two mutually inconsis-
tent stories. On the one hand, the masculine subject tells himself: "Castra-
tion has occurred, but (thank God) it was not me who was castrated but
someone else. I still possess the phallus. It must be the feminine who lost
it." This position is untenable because, deep in our hearts, we all feel the
reality of castration. When confronted with castration, the masculine must
adopt a second strategy. The masculine now tells himself: "True, I no
longer have the original phallus, but it was not taken from me. Rather, I
(retroactively) agreed to give it up to the symbolic order in exchange for a
new object of desire. 30 Therefore, the masculine in this second mode is the
claim that no one object of desire is significant because it can always be
replaced in exchange. In economic terms, the masculine claims to be
indifferent between two objects. This, of course, is also untenable. If the
masculine were indifferent to the object of desire, he would not desire it; he
would not be so anxious to engage in exchange. As Hegel insisted, ex-
change is the actualization of desire, not indifference. As in Hegel, it is the
moment of recognition in this imaginary exchange which constitutes subjec-
tivity.
2. Hegelian Versus Lacanian Contract
At first blush, Lacan's pessimistic account of exchange seems at odds
with Hegel's optimistic one. Hegel's abstract person eagerly seeks a future
exchange as the means of achieving a satisfactory subjectivity and the inter-
30. The infant entering the symbolic world of language and law feels castrated by the
function known as the father. Masculine society allows the male child to adopt the fantasy that
he is making a bargain with the father. He will "consent" to his castration from the phallic
mother (the feminine) in exchange for access to empirical women's bodies in the future in
physical sexual relations and marriage. In Lacan, men attempt to achieve recognition as
subjects, speaking members of society, through the possession and exchange of the object of
desire with other subjects, in the same way that, in Hegel, persons achieve recognition as legal
subjects through the possession, enjoyment, and exchange of property with other legal
subjects. And so, as chronicled by structuralist anthropologists such as Claude Idvi-Strauss,
societies are structured by the literal exchange of women among men of different clans or
tribes. This strategy is doomed, in Lacan, because the object of desire - the phallic
mother - is lost. The possession of the penis and the exchange of women are poor substi-
tutes. Moreover, the last element of recognition is denied in the masculine position. Never-
theless, although necessarily unsuccessful, this may be the best that society can do.
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relationship relationship of abstract right. Lacan's subject reluctantly accepts
an imaginary past exchange as an explanation for an unsatisfactorily hollow
subjectivity and lack of immediate sexual relations. Upon further consider-
ation, we can see that Lacanianism and Hegelianism represent the negative
and affirmative moments of the same dialectic of subjectivity.
The vulgar misunderstanding of the Hegelian dialectic is as follows:
First, one identifies a concept (thesis). Second, one identifies the internal
contradiction that the concept necessarily implies its negation (antithesis).
Third, through the process known as sublation (Aujhebung), the thesis and
antithesis are reconciled into a satisfactory and totalizing reconciliation (syn-
thesis)." Under this oversimplistic approach, one first identifies the internal
contradictions of the abstract person. (For example, on one hand, the essence
of the abstract person is freedom, but freedom can only be potential and not
actual in the state of nature.) These contradictions would then be resolved
by the creation of subjectivity in which the potential of freedom becomes
actual.
Such a reading represses the fact that the German word Aufheben means
to preserve, as well as to negate. It also reflects a failure to comprehend the
fundamental Hegelian doctrine of the identity of identity and difference.
That is, it is not true that when thesis and antithesis are sublated they are
totally absorbed into and replaced by the new synthesis. They are preserved
as well.
Sublation is the recognition that two concepts which seemed necessarily
contradictory, are at one moment the same. Sublation is the actualization of
the identity, which is only potential in the original concepts, considered
separately. But, this does not mean that sublation destroys or denies the
difference between the original concepts. Rather, for something to be actual,
it must be potential. The original concepts which represent the potentiality
of the sublated concept must retain a moment of separate existence so that
they can continue to serve as the necessary constituents or building blocks
of the synthesis. In other words, in order for the sublated concept to exist
(be actual), the conditions of its potentiality must also exist.32
31. The thesis-antithesis-synthesis terminology is not genuine Hegel, but seems to be a
vulgarized version of Karl Marx's appropriation of the Hegelian dialectical method.
32. To use a metaphor which I have used elsewhere, the relationship between the poten-
tiality and actuality in Hegel can be compared to the relationship between a foundation and a
building. When one digs a hole, it is in actuality only a hole. But, it is potentially a founda-
tion. We can only say retroactively that it is in fact a foundation once the building is built
upon it. The building actualizes the foundation. But it does not follow from this that once
the building is built the foundation is no longer necessary and can be filled in. Rather,
the foundation made the building possible. As any engineer knows, if one were to destroy
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The doctrine of the identity of identity and difference also requires a
recognition that there is an essential moment of unsublated difference which
remains between the two original concepts. Indeed, if there was not, they
would not be different concepts. As emphasized by Slavoj 2i~ek, sublation
is not just a proactive process predicting a future coherent and necessary
resolution which will supersede present contradictions. Sublation is also
simultaneously the retroactive breakdown of what initially appeared as a
harmonious whole into unresolved inherent contradiction.3 This is a neces-
sary result of the circularity of the dialectic. Consequently, sublation is
quadratic, not trilateral in nature. It cannot be reduced to thesis-antithesis-
synthesis. Rather, there remains the original concept, its negation, the
moment when they are revealed to be the same, and the simultaneous recog-
nition that there always remains a moment of essential negativity, an un-
sublated kernel which Jacques Derrida calls "differance"34 and Slavoj 2iiek
calls the indivisible remainder.3" Both the moment of resolution and the
moment of irresolvability are equally true and essential.
Consequently, the Hegelian analysis of the dialectic of property repre-
sents the progressive future oriented aspect of sublation as the contradictions
of abstract personhood looks forward to the moment of their future resolu-
tion into subjectivity. The Lacanian analysis of the dialectic of sexuality
represents the retroactive past-oriented aspect of sublation when the subject
looks back and recognizes the moment of the past irresolvabiity of the
fundamental contradiction of personality known as castration.
Moreover, the Hegelian dialectic is one of constant movement. Each
time a contradistinction is sublated into a new concept, the new concept will
be analyzed in terms of its negation. This recognition of internal contradic-
tion will require a new sublation and the creation of a new resolution, which
will lead to a new negation and so on. Any apparent resolution in sublation
is, therefore, necessarily only temporary. The dialectic of property initially
stops at the resolution known as subjectivity and abstract right, but Hegel
immediately demonstrates the inadequacy of these concepts. Consequently,
the Philosophy of Right continues the dialectic of relationship from abstract
right to the more adequate regimes of morality and ethical life as society
the foundation, the building would come crashing down. See SCHROEDER, supra note 8;
Schroeder, supra note 8, at 1561.
33. See .2EK, supra note 29, at 122-23.
34. JACQUES DERRIDA, Semiology and Grammatology, Interview with Julia Kristeva,
in POSIONS 15, 24-29 (Alan Bass trans., 1981).
35. The concept of the "hard kernel of the real" pervades 2ilek's work. See, e.g.,
SLAVOJ =IEK, THE INDIVISIBLE REMAINDER: AN ESSAY ON SCHELLING AND RELATED
MATTERS 145 (1996).
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progresses from civil society to the liberal state and the subject becomes the
free individual.
This means that the satisfaction of the achievement of subjectivity is
only tentative and temporary in both Hegel and Lacan. It is precisely this
fundamental failure of interrelationality - this essential negativity at the
heart of subjectivity - which both enables desire to function and allows us
the space to act freely.
3. The Feminine
The phallic object of desire exchanged by masculine subjects in the
symbolic order is the feminine. The masculine is the fantasy that one can
regain the whole lost in castration by finding the perfect mate who will fill
the hole left by castration. The feminine is, therefore, the mediatrix of
subjectivity - the third which men use to make themselves into subjects.
And so what is the feminine? First, a caveat. The feminine as radical
negativity has no positive content. All attempts to give positive content to
the feminine - such as cultural feminism - are masculine fantasies (i.e.,
the imaginary). Nevertheless, there are certain things we can say about it.
The Lacanian feminine is a different way of confronting the universal
experience of castration; it is another mode of failure. If we are masculine
when we try to deny castration, we are feminine when we accept castration,
loss, and negativity. Lacan rewrote Freud's concept of penis envy not as the
actual longing of women to have a penis, but as a nostalgic, depressive
mourning for lost wholeness.36 It is a common error to assume that the
proposition that the feminine is the acceptance of castration is a judgment
that the feminine is inferior to the masculine. Instead, the feminine can be
seen as superior in that it is more honest37 and, therefore, stronger than the
cowardly masculine which runs from the truth. The feminine must be
repressed precisely because she is a reminder that the masculine is a lie. She
is Juno Moneta.
The feminine acceptance of castration is the understanding that we are
no longer and can never again be self-sufficient, complete, and whole by
ourselves. The phallic object of desire is our former integrity which we feel
has been lost in castration but which, in fact, has never existed. No "thing"
which we ever had, or could can hold or exchange in the future could take
36. See JANE GALLOP, READING LAcAN 148 (1985); SCHROEDER, supra note 8.
37. See SCHROEDER, supra note 8. By identifying castration with the feminine, the
masculine tries to pretend that women are incomplete men. But, as Ellie Ragland-Sullivan
explains, the Lacanian interpretation is that it is men that are failed women. Ellie Ragland-
Sullivan, The Sexual Masquerade: A Lacanian Theory of Sexual Difference, in LACAN AND
THE SUBJECT OF LANGUAGE 49, 62 (E. Ragland-Sullivan & Mark Bracher eds., 1991).
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its place. Biographically, our subjectivity first starts to develop when we
initially become aware that our mother (or mother substitute)38 is not literally
an extension of ourselves. Consequently, because our first experience of
subjectivity is separation (castration) from another, we retroactively posit
that prior to subjectivity-castration, we must have been one with the mother.
Consequently, our symbolic order names the first other - the other with
whom we were once joined prior to castration - as the mother. This all
powerful, all embracing mother is what is lost in castration. She is therefore
a phallus, the phallic mother. The search for wholeness is, therefore, retro-
actively rewritten as the desire to regress back into the maternal womb of the
mythical phallic mother. The phallus is, therefore, the feminine as phallic
mother.
When the phallus is thought of as the signifier of subjectivity or that
which the masculine has and exchanges, it was conflated with that which
men have - the penis - and exchange - women. When the phallus is
thought of as the feminine, it is conflated with the physical analog that
women are and enjoy - the female body.
E. Sexuality and Anatomy
Why do we call the position of having and exchanging the phallus
"masculine" and the position of being and enjoying the phallus "feminine?"
How does sexuality become linked to biology? We are unsatisfied with the
symbolic because it is artificial, fleeting, incomplete, and the cause of our
castration. We desire the integrity and permanence of the real. Although
the concept of the phallus is symbolic, the phallus can never be attained in
38. This terminology reflects the fact that in our society, that which we feel we have lost
in castration is immediate access to the "mother." The "mother" is our first nurturer who is
the first "other" the infant confronts. The first seeds of infantile consciousness amount to the
realization that other things exist, that the object world - mother - is not merely an extension
of himself. Of course, empirically, in our (and perhaps every empirical) society the infant's
biological mother usually occupies the role of first nurturer. Even when someone else
empirically occupies that role, such as the infant's father or a nursemaid, society recognizes
that person as a mother surrogate - not merely serving the psychoanalytic role of mother, but
filling the role empirically normally filled by mothers. Consequently, it is not specifically
relevant to any individual's psychoanalytic development that his or her first nurturer was or
was not his or her mother. Lacanian psychoanalysis is a story told retroactively. It is not the
child looking forward who recognizes his nurturer as a mother surrogate. Rather, it is the
adult located in a society which has already assigned sexuated positions and gender roles looks
back and remembers the nurturer as a mother surrogate. I discuss the retroactive nature of
both Hegel and Lacan's dialectics essentially in SCHROEDER, supra note 8. Probably the
foremost proponent of a retroactive reading of Hegel and Lacan is Slavoj tilek. See, e.g.,
SLAvoJ 2EK, FOR THEY KNOW NOT WHAT THEY DO: ENJOYMENT AS A POLITICAL FACTOR
129-31 (1991).
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the symbolic precisely because it is that which was lost in the moment of
castration that created the symbolic. That is, the phallus is the real that the
symbolic expels. Consequently, we need to get beyond the symbolic in
order to get to the real. We try to do this in the imaginary order by identi-
fying natural analogs (which seem "real") to stand in for the symbolic
concepts.39 As in Hegel, our true desire is the desire of the Other - the
achievement of subjectivity through recognition. We desire the phallus
derivatively as the mediatrix of subjectivity. But the phallus is unobtainable
(lost) by definition. Our strategy is to pretend that it is some obtainable
object (not the phallus) that we desire instead. We tell ourselves "if I could
just possess... [fill in the blank: that handsome man's penis or his child,
that beautiful woman's body, that fancy new car, that promotion, etc.], then
I will be satisfied." This imaginary object, the "objetpetit a" serves retroac-
tively as the object cause of our desire.
For unexplained historical reasons, anatomical males are dominant in
our society.' As a result, we conflate what at first blush seems to be the
more powerful position of sexuality - having and exchanging the phallus -
with maleness. This is why Lacan calls this position the masculine. Because
the masculine pretends to possess the phallus, we conflate the phallus with
some part of the anatomy that men have and women do not - specifically,
the penis. Note, that the reason why the penis (rather than some other male
characteristic, such as the beard) is chosen as the privileged organ is not
because it is impressive, but because it is fragile.41 Since the phallus is the
39. This idea of the imaginary object which takes a place in the real in order to serve
as the cause of desire is called the "object petit a." This is probably the most difficult and
contradictory idea in all of Lacan's infuriatingly difficult system. The limited purposes of this
article fortunately do not necessitate a full discussion. See SCHROEDER, supra note 8. For
the limited purposes of this article, it represents the place where the three psychic orders
overlap.
40. Some feminists think they critique Lacan when they point out the implicit misogyny
of his choice of terminology. They think this contradicts his claim that his definition of
sexuality is non-anatomical and, therefore, neutral. I argue that Lacan's terminology is not
neutral, because Lacan tries to define sexuality in a non-neutral society. See id.
41. Id. Lacan's theory of castration subtly echoes St. Augustine's theory of sexuality,
which has so greatly influenced traditional Christian teaching. (For a discussion of Augustin-
ian theory and how it is unconsciously reflected in Catharine MacKinnon's supposedly radical
theory of sexuality, see generally Jeanne L. Schroeder, 7he Taming of the Shrew: The Liberal
Attempt to Mainstream Radical Feminist Theory, 5 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 123 (1992).) Saint
Augustine, like Lacan, insisted that human beings are irreparably split. Adam's sin sundered
the pre-lapsarian harmony between man and God, man and woman, and soul and body. See
PETER BROWN, THE BODY AND SOCIETY: MEN, WOMEN AND SEXUAL RENUNCIATION IN
EARLY CHRSTIANrrY 405, 407, 418 (1988); see also AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD 413-14,
416-17, 457, 471 (Marcus Dods trans., 1950). God literally inscribed Adam's Fall into the
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lost object of desire, it must be identified with something that could be lost.
The penis can serve this role not just because women do not have one
(suggesting that humans can lose them) and not just because men can be, and
sometimes are, physically castrated. Rather, it is because the penis seems
to have developed a mind of its own. Being out of control, the penis is
already partly lost. Like subjectivity, it is what a man simultaneously feels
is most himself, and yet alien to him. The penis can stand in for the phallus
because of its unpredictable failure to stand up.
By conflating the phallus with the penis, the masculine not only tries to
refuse to see his own castration, he tries to account for the sense of castration
by exiling it to women. The masculine further tries to deny castration by
pretending that the masculine community is engaged in exchanging phallic
objects of desire. And so, the phallic object of desire is also conflated with
that which is other than men, so that men can exchange it among each other.
Because the sense of castration is associated with the false memory that the
infant was once one with his mother, the phallic object of wholeness is
associated with the maternal body. The phallus is not only conflated with the
male organ, but also with the female body. This has been played out liter-
ally in traditional family structures in which men exchange women in mar-
riage.4' I would note in passing at this time that the English word "tradition"
comes from the Latin traditio, "to hand over." Among other meanings, the
male body as a constant reminder of Original Sin. Augustine called sexuality the poena
reciproca. The human body serves as a "tiny mirror, in which men and women could catch
a glimpse of themselves." BROWN, supra, at 418. Before the Fall, the penis was a limb
subject to the conscious control of the soul like an arm and a leg. AUGUSTINE, supra, at 470-
72. As soon as Adam and Eve ate of the Forbidden Fruit they "knew that they were naked."
Genesis 3:7. Augustine interpreted this to mean that Adam had the first involuntary erection.
AUGUSTINE, supra, at 422, 440, 465; BROWN, supra, at 416. The loss of control of the penis
is, therefore, the holy symbol of the debased and split nature of man in the state of sin - in
Augustine's words, man's desire "is divided against itself." AUGUSTINE, supra, at 465;
BROWN, supra, at 417. Although this can be seen in the embarrassing masculinity of inoppor-
tune tumescence, it can be seen more forcefully in the humiliating failure or lack of impo-
tence.
[Slometimes this lust importunes them in spite of themselves, and sometimes fails
them when they desire to feel it, so that though lust rages in the mind, it stirs not
in the body. Thus, strangely enough, this emotion not only fails to obey the
legitimate desire to beget offspring, but also refuses to serve lascivious lust; ....
AUGUSTINE, supra, at 465.
42. Early Lacan was influenced by the structuralist anthropology of Claude Uavi-Strauss
who held that societies are formed through arrangements by which men of different clans
exchange women. Late Lacan moved further and further away from claims that his theory
was an empirical account of individual or societal development. Rather, like Hegel's, it is a
speculative account, which often plays itself out in our empirical lives.
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Tradfitio was the name of the medieval European marriage ceremony where-
by the bride was transferred to her husband. 3 It also means "treason."
Of course, the masculine strategy doesn't work. The phallus never
really existed; it is a retroactive invention to account for our sense of loss.
The masculine claims to trade something it never had (immediate unity with
the feminine as the phallic mother) in exchange for something that does not
exist (immediate relations) in order to achieve something with no content
(subjectivity).' Men lie to themselves when the claim to possess the phallus
when they merely have the penis. Every man in his depth knows he is
castrated and that the object of desire is not within his grasp. Men lie to
themselves and others when they claim to be indifferent to the phallic woman
as the object of exchange. Exchange only occurs because the masculine
cares about nothing else.
Masculinity, therefore, is a type of failure (as is, of course, femininity).
Each of the two masculine strategies are untenable when taken alone, but
they are mutually inconsistent when taken together. Lacan, therefore,
rewrites Sigmund Freud's concept of castration anxiety not as the fear of
being physically mutilated, but the fear of having to confront one's own
castration, or even worse, the fear that one will not be able to keep up
appearances so that other men will learn that he is castrated.
Subjectivity is a fiction. Specifically, it is the tale of the Emperor's
New Clothes45 - a universal adult conspiracy that that which does not exist
does exist and that the king (the masculine subject) has "it." But being
fictional, or artificial, does not imply that subjectivity doesn't exist. Artifi-
cial means literally made by art. The creation of subjectivity is alchemy.
It is the magic by which we make that which does not exist function.
43. JAMES A. BRUNDAGE, LAW, SEX, AND CHRISTIAN SOCIETY IN MEDIEVAL EUROPE
262, 266-68 (1987).
44. 2I±EK explains:
Lacan rejects all usual attempts to account for the prohibition of incest: form utili-
tarianism to Levi-Strauss, they all promise something in exchange for this radical
renunciation; they all present it as a 'reasonable' decision which provides a greater
amount of long-term pleasure, a multitude of women, and so on - in [short], they
all refer to some Good as its ground, contrary to Lacan for whom the prohibition
of incest is unconditional, since it is radically unaccountable. It, I give something
in exchange for nothing - or (and therein consists its fundamental paradox) in so
far as the incestuous object is in itself impossible, I give nothing in exchange for
something (the 'permitted' non-incestuous object).
ti2EK, supra note 38, at 230-31.
45. See 2j2EK, supra note 38, at 11-12; Jeanne L. Schroeder & David Gray Carlson, The
Subject is Nothing, 5 LAw AND CRITIQUE 93, 100-01 (1994).
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From a feminine standpoint, the physical analog for perfect integrity is
the idealized image of perfect virgin motherhood (the "phallic mother")
which of course no actual woman can ever achieve. The physical analog for
loss of integrity is, of course, loss of virginity - just as a woman's initiation
into sexual intercourse requires permanent physical disfigurement, so initia-
tion into social intercourse (the symbolic order of law and language) requires
permanent psychic disfigurement. Only the Goddesses (including the Virgin
Mary) achieved motherhood without loss. This is why the divine is real.
Lacan is not a restatement of the traditional misogynist imagery of the
masculine as the active subject and the feminine as passive object. Rather,
it is both an account of how this stereotypical imagery arises as well as a
subversive rewriting of this imagery. First, although the masculine claims
to be the position of the free acting subject, in fact, it is only the feminine
which can actualize the negativity which is the essence of freedom and
subjectivity. The masculine claims to have subjectivity, but the subject is the
feminine.
Second, although the masculine's claim to have "it" enables him to
speak and act as a legal subject, the masculine is, in fact, trapped in the
symbolic order of law. The masculine only seems to act, but actually travels
around in a circle.
The masculine is totally caught up in the symbolic order. The mascu-
line subject is not merely the subject of law and language, he is subject to
law and language. The feminine in contrast is subjected by the symbolic
order. The symbolic order tries to abject the feminine object by exiling her.
But by being located at least partly in the real, the feminine opens up the
possibility of escape from the symbolic order (i.e., freedom). It is true that
the feminine, as the acceptance of castration, can be the position of inertia -
depression. But as Freud taught, it is the acceptance of loss which enables
us to mourn. And it is only mourning which allows us to bury the dead, and
move on. The impossible feminine is simultaneously the possibility of
freedom - the dream of creating something entirely new.
F. The Necessary Repression of the Feminine by the
Masculine and the Law
The masculine position represses the feminine. If the masculine is the
position of having "it," then the masculine sees himself-as the position of
subjectivity in terms of the speaking, active subject who bears legal rights.
The feminine, who does not have "it," must be the position of objectivity -
the silent object of men's rights and desires without rights of her own. If she
represents the castration that men try to deny, she must be put out of sight.
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The feminine is the knowledge that signification is never fixed like meaning,
that we never achieve immediate relationship (i.e., have "it"). We must
forget the feminine position in order to speak. Although this is a purely
symbolic concept, we play it out in the real through a myriad of historical
institutions which impose modesty and privacy on the feminine. Examples
include the Islamic chador and harem, the nineteenth century Western cult
of feminine domesticity, and its contemporary descendent, the Robin West-
Carol Gilligan cultural "feminism" of female relationality, which all implic-
itly impose modesty and privacy on the feminine. The so-called female
"different voice" is, in fact, just the feminine's silent miming of the mascu-
line voice.6
Indeed, law necessarily represses the feminine. The feminine, as the
acceptance of castration/violation, is the false memory of a mythical past
integrity and the impossible dream of future reintegration. The feminine is
the past and the future; simultaneously the always already lost, and the not
yet found. The masculine as the denial of castration is the claim of having
"it," of being intact now. The masculine is the vain attempt to capture the
present - to stop the flow of time. The masculine is the position of speech
and of judgment because it is the necessary fiction that meaning is static, that
rules have black letters, and that justice can be achieved now which enables
us to speak and act. To do so, we must repress the fact that the masculine
claim to subjectivity is a fiction and silence the feminine reminders that we
are castrated, that law and language are artificial, contingent and always
slipping, and that justice is an ideal, an ought, to which we must always
strive precisely because it can never be reached.
Since the feminine is also the mediating object of desire that the mascu-
line exchanges to create subjectivity, the necessity of mediation and the third
must also be repressed by the masculine. In an attempt to achieve the
immediate relation to the phallic mother lost in castration, the masculine
pretends that all relations are immediate and binary. This is imaginary. This
requires the masculine simultaneously to take two mutually inconsistent
positions which mirror the two inconsistent masculine responses to castra-
tion. First, the subject claims an immediate subject-object relation to the
phallus-penis in possession. Second, the subject claims immediate subject-
subject relations with other men in exchange. This is binary because, in
exchange, the feminine object herself loses independent significance. She
just becomes a ghostly place holder for the relationship between the exchang-
ing subjects.
46. SCHROEDER, supra note 8.
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But, it is a fundamental thesis of psychoanalysis that whatever is re-
pressed in the symbolic necessarily returns in the real. The more the mascu-
line denies feminine subjectivity, the more he admits she exists. Indeed, it
is the feminine, not the masculine, which can claim to be the true position
of subjectivity. She is in the position of the radical negativity at the center
of the split castrated subject which is the condition of freedom posited by
Hegel. The feminine as negativity is created by her very repression, the
very denial of her existence. Consequently, the more the feminine is denied,
the stronger she is. In Lacan's terms, the feminine does not "exist, she
insists."4' To paraphrase 2iiek, the problem with the feminine is not that she
is unattainable, but that she won't go away."8 She is Juno Moneta - the
Woman who Reminds.
III. Applications in Law and Jurisprudence
A. The Masculine and Feminine Phallic Metaphors For Property
What does my identification of the phallic nature of property and the
Lacanian insistence that the reduction of sexuality to anatomy is a conflation
specifically have to do with law?
From a Lacanian standpoint, property is phallic. It is the creation of
subjectivity with respect to the possession, enjoyment, and exchange of an
object of desire. Property, being legal, is of course symbolic. However, as
with subjectivity, our desire to achieve the wholeness we call the real leads
us to try to identify the symbolic with natural analogs. We are drawn to
identify property with the physical. Since property is sexual, we are drawn
to apply the same anatomic metaphors to describe property that we use to
describe sexuality. When we stand in the masculine position, we concentrate
on the masculine elements of possessing and alienating, and we confuse pos-
sessing and alienating with holding, exchanging, and taling tangible things
47. 2i2EK states:
"Woman is a symptom of man" means that Man himself exists only
through woman qua his symptom: all his ontological consistency hangs on,
is suspended from, is "externalized" in his symptom. In other words,
man literally ex-sists: his entire being lies "out there," in woman.
Woman on the other hand, does not exist, she insists, which is why she
does not come to be only through man. Something in her escapes the
relation to Man, the reference to the phallic enjoyment; and, as is well
known, Lacan endeavored to capture this excess by the notion of a
"non-all "feminine jouissance.
LIZEK, supra note 29, at 188 (footnote omitted).
48. "Mhe trouble withjouissance is not that it is unattainable... but, rather, that one
can never get rid of it. . . ." I2EK, supra note 35, at 93.
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that remind us of the penis and the female body. Further, when we stand in
the masculine position, we tend to repress the feminine element of enjoy-
ment. Under the masculine metaphor, losses of property are seen as castra-
tions - the taking of possession. We try to deny castration by preventing
takings through equitable remedies, or by pretending that it can be cured
through exchange (i.e., legal remedies).
But, whatever is repressed in the symbolic returns in the real. And so,
a feminine phallic metaphor for property is also implicit, but usually hidden,
in property discourse. The feminine metaphor for property concentrates on
the subject's identification with, and ecstatic enjoyment of, property. It is
that which we enter and enjoy and protect from invasion by others. Loss of
property is seen as permanent, as loss of self, rape, violation, and pollution.
These are losses that cannot be cured, only mourned.
Because the law and judging are psychoanalytically masculine, law
tends to privilege the masculine metaphors and to repress feminine meta-
phors. Specifically, there is a strong tendency to describe property disputes
in terms of one of the two masculine elements (possession and exchange)
even when they involve the feminine elements (identification and enjoy-
ment). The law further tries to deny castration and the feminine necessity
of mediation by analyzing property as a binary immediate relationship and
repressing the feminine understanding that property is always a trilateral (or
even quadrilateral) mediated relationship.
When property is reduced to possession, it is not described in the
Hegelian, symbolic concept of the right of one subject to exclude other
subjects from his object of desire - i.e., a trilateral relationship in which the
legal relationship between the two subjects is mediated by the object in
dispute. Rather, it is described in terms of the seemingly real binary rela-
tionship by which one subject physically holds a tangible object in the way
a man "possesses" his organ. Other subjects are irrelevant to this purely
physical relation.
This is obviously untenable because for something to be a legal right it
must, by definition, be enforceable against others. Consequently, the
masculine position alternately describes property in terms of the single
element of exchange. But once again, in this discourse, exchange is not
described in terms of the trilateral symbolic relationship of intersubjectivity
mediated by objectivity. Rather, the significance of the object is minimized
so that exchange can be described as an immediate binary relationship
between two subjects. Probably the most obvious example of this is
Hohfeld's insistence that property does not necessarily relate to objects at all,
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a position widely accepted in contemporary property scholarship.49 A
variant of this is the clich6 (or more accurately, canard) that the Uniform
Commercial Code has not merely eliminated the object from property, but
has disaggregated property entirely into an arbitrary "bundle of sticks."
50
Another variation of this is the law and economics concept of indifference
which reduces property to its "exchange" value. 1 That is, in the perfect
market, objects lose all independent significance because exchange continues
until everybody is indifferent between owning the object itself or its ex-
change value embodied in its market price. In its most extreme form, this
approach mimics the second masculine strategy for confronting castration -
the assertion that one has not been castrated because one has (retroactively)
given up the phallus in exchange for some promised future object of desire.
For example, Judge Richard Posner analyzes damage awards in terms of
contract. This implies, in the case of tort, that the consent of the victim
requisite to contract is deemed to be given retroactively and constructively
when the court awards damages in an amount which supposedly makes the
victim indifferent to her loss.
5 2
These most common approaches to property repress the feminine
element in several ways. First, there is a strong tendency to ignore or
downplay the feminine element of enjoyment. Property disputes do not
always involve the right of possession of a single object (e.g., Which of two
claimants is entitled to the object of desire? Who can exclude whom?) or the
right of alienation/exchange (e.g., Has one party agreed to transfer her
property to the other? What are the terms of the transfer?). Sometimes, the
dispute concerns defining the borders of inconsistent uses of different ob-
jects. For example, consider a simple example of an environmental nui-
sance. A consumer has a spring on her land. A widget factory is located
next door. When the widget producer enjoys his factory by making widgets,
49. HOHFELD, supra note 7, at 75-78, 85. I critique the attempt by Hohfeld and his
followers to deny the object of property extensively in Jeanne L. Schroeder, Chix Nix Bundle-
O-Sfix: A Feminist Critique of the Disaggregation of Property, 93 MICH. L. REV. 239, 271-
305 (1994).
50. See Schroeder, supra note 49, at 242-44, 305-12; Jeanne L. Schroeder, Death and
Transfiguration: The Myth That the U.C.C. Disaggregated Property, 69 TEMp. L. REv. 1281,
1282 (1996).
51. This view is implicit in Calabresi and Melamed's notion of "liability regimes" which
views damages awarded in environmental nuisance disputes as forced sales of the plaintiff's
entitlement to be free of pollution to the polluter at a purchase price equal to the damages. See
Jules L. Coleman & Jody Kraus, Rethinking the Theory of Legal Rights, 95 YALE L.J. 1335,
1357 (1986).
52. Coleman and Kraus recognize that Posner does not state this view expressly, but
argue that it is implicit in and required by the internal logic of his argument. Id. at 1356-61.
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industrial waste flows into the aquifer, making it impossible for the consumer
to enjoy her property by drinking her water. The consumer's enjoyment also
reciprocally, but not symmetrically, affects the producer's enjoyment in the
sense that insofar as she has an enforceable legal right to clean water, the
producer is hindered in his ability to enjoy his factory. As a society, we
must decide the respective borders of these two parties competing but
necessarily inconsistent rights to enjoy their respective objects of property.
And yet, the predominant tradition for analyzing just such environmental
issues, founded by Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed, insists that the
parties are disputing the possession, or terms of exchange, of a single object
of property which they call an entitlement.53
Second, property jurisprudence tends to repress the feminine element
of identification with the object of desire. Interference with property rights
is implicitly analogized to castration - in constitutional language, the taking
of a thing. In the masculine denial of castration, castration can be cured by
giving back the thing taken (or an identical substitute) and restoring posses-
sion, or claiming to be indifferent to the object taken and to be satisfied with
its monetary value in exchange. Traditional notions of damages and takings
do not take into account the sense of loss of self in addition to loss of prop-
erty. Who has not heard a victim of theft who has described the crime in
terms of feeling violated?
Third, the law has a tendency to repress the feminine as the silent or
absent third. I have already discussed how the identification of property with
possession or exchange tries to reduce the trilateral mediated aspect of
property into a simple binary immediate relation. Property law also ignores
the fact that property disputes can never be limited to the two litigants.
Rather, property always implicates other silent and absent third parties, such
as the creditors and heirs of the parties.
B. Thanatos of the Perfect Market
My latest project is to explore the erotics of the law and economic
movement. This movement has long mystified me. This is not because I am
insensitive to the elegant appeal of economics or doubt that it might offer
insights on the law of the market. Indeed, my undergraduate degree is in
economics, and when I began law school in the mid 1970s, I was surprised
53. See generally Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability
Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089 (1972). I dis-
cuss this extensively in Jeanne L. Schroeder, Three's a Crowd: Calabresi and Melamed's
Repression of the Feminine (1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Washington and Lee
Law Review).
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at the degree of ignorance of economic doctrine in legal academia. Unfortu-
nately, today economics is in ill repute among progressives in the academy.
I believe this is because the term has been co-opted by one school which is
generally characterized by lack of self-critical awareness and has bred sloppy
law with naive economics to create a misshapen and barren offspring. Let
me again return to Blackstone. Blackstone began his inquiry into property
law by noting how it inflamed man's desire. He continued:
And yet there are very few, that will give themselves the trouble to con-
sider the original and foundation of [property]. Pleased as we are with the
possession, we seem afraid to look back... as if fearful .... 54
Law and economics literature revolves around an ideal called the
"perfect market." Much of this scholarship is based on a vulgarized inter-
pretation of the Coase Theorem, stating that in a perfect market law makes
no difference from an economic matter because all legal entitlements would
be immediately and costlessly transferred to the higher valuing user, ensur-
ing an efficient allocation of entitlements. They conclude that the law should
be interpreted or amended either to eliminate as many market imperfections
as possible, or otherwise to ensure that outcomes mimic that which would
come about if the market were perfect.
And yet, as Blackstone observed with respect to property, the literature
simultaneously is curiously reticent in discussing the characteristics of this
ideal. Law and economics seems afraid to look back and consider its ori-
gins, as though fearful. Or, more accurately, it turns away from this primal
scene with the same embarrassment and the shame each of us feels when we
contemplate the details our own personal origins in the parental bed. I
suspect that this resemblance is not merely coincidental. The perfect market,
like one's own conception, is "real" in the Lacanian sense. As we shall see,
to look back, to confront the real, is not merely frightening, it can be deadly.
1. Eros and Thanatos
Before I turn to the desire of law and economics, I need to speak very
briefly and inadequately about the Lacanian concept of jouissance and the
twin desires of Eros and Thanatos. In his late work, Lacan posited that the
feminine was capable of what he called "icuissance." The French word
Jouissance," which can be literally translated as "enjoyment," includes both
the legal concept of quiet enjoyment of property as well as sexual orgasm. 5
54. 2 BLAcKsToNE, supra note 1, at 2.
55. There is no precise English cognate for the French word "jouissance" used by
Lacan. Literally, it refers to enjoyment or joyfulness generally. It includes the legal right of
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Injouissance the subject takes on the feminine position of being and enjoying
the object of desire and submerges into the real. Being and enjoying the
phallus become one and the same.
The order of the real is that which is beyond and, therefore, limits the
symbolic realm of language and law. By submerging with the real, the
subject loses her subjectivity in the sense of losing her place in the symbolic.
She cannot speak to others and achieve the intersubjective recognition, which
is the condition of subjectivity, while standing in the feminine position of
jouissance. This is because the moment she tries to describe her experience
ofjouissance, she is no longer in an unmediated relationship with the real.
To speak is to interpret experience in the symbolic. To picture it is to
interpret it in the imaginary. In order to attain subjectivity she must reject
her enjoyment, submit herself to the symbolic, and take on the masculine
role. 6 This is why the speaking subject is not merely the subject of the
symbolic, he is always also subject to the symbolic.
This, in turn, makes jouissance, like Hegelian enjoyment, necessary to
subjectivity, even though it is inadequate. Subjectivity is only created by
castration which walls off the real from the symbolic. One cannot forbid
what is impossible. Jouissance - the momentary achievement of femininity
as merger with the real - is the transgression of the incest taboo which
proves that what was once impossible is now merely forbidden. Prohibition
calls the feminine into existence.
Lacan recognized that use as enjoyment, jouissance, reflects the femi-
nine position. It is a concept of enjoyment that includes not only pleasure,
but obscene delight in pain and death.Y Jouissance may be thought of as the
"enjoyment" of property, but it is also a slang term for sexual orgasm specifically. BICE
BENVENUTO & ROomE KENNEDY, THE WORKS OF JACQUES LACAN: AN INTRODUCTION 179
(1986). Lacan's term is not perfectly translatable because it is defined as that which is beyond
the masculine, symbolic order of language.
If, as Lacan taught, unconscious drives do not always wish one's good, feminist
theories that have equated jouissance with pleasure and the erotic pleasure of
sexual freedom to gender liberation, have missed the meaning of Lacan's rethink-
ing of the links between repetition, the death beyond the pleasure principle, and
jouissance.
Ragland-Sullivan, supra note 37, at 70. Jouissance, is not the same as what Lacan calls
"pleasure" (plaisir). "Pleasure, for Lacan, is bound to desire as a defence against jouissance,
and is a prohibition against going beyond a certain limit of jouissance. Jouissance, like death,
represents something whose limits cannot be overcome." BENEVENuTo & KENNEDY, supra,
at 179.
56. See GROSZ, supra note 22, at 139.
57. Because enjoyment is a forbidden domain and obscene, pleasure always involves a
certain displeasure. See 2I2EK, supra note 38, at 239.
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fulfillment of desire in the sense of the breakdown of the subject/object
distinction. It is the psychoanalytic experience of breaking out from the
symbolic order of speech and the imaginary order of imagery and achieving
direct, unmediated contact with the real. Although anatomical men are
capable ofjouissance, jouissance requires one to take on the position of the
femiine58 as speaking requires one to take on the position of the masculine. 9
Exchange is Eros. Jouissance is Thanatos. In the masculine story of
Lacanian psychoanalysis, the destruction of the subject/object distinction
would be suicidal in the sense that it also destroys subjectivity, conscious-
ness, and language.
Eros is the masculine fiction that we could heal the hole left by castra-
tion if we could just obtain the perfect mate through exchange and achieve
a perfect immediate union. Eros is the desire to achieve the lost feminine.
The lost feminine has no positive content; she is nothing in the sense of
radical negativity. To achieve a perfect union with the lost feminine would
destroy the very separation and mediation that permits subjectivity. We
rightly desire the promise of freedom offered by the radical negativity of the
feminine, but to achieve radical negativity is, obviously, to negate everything
including our subjectivity. Such a yearning is the morbid nostalgia of
Thanatos - the death wish. It is an attempt to deny castration by regressing
back to a preconscious union with the m(o)ther in the real. Even if we could
achieve the real ofjouissance by denying the symbolic, we also destroy the
real which does not pre-exist the symbolic, but is constituted by it. Desire
is the attempt to achieve wholeness. Eros is the masculine position of
desire - the attempt to acquire and join with the perfect complementary
mate who in the imaginary will fill out the hole left by castration. Thanatos
is the feminine position of desire - the attempt to once again become
unviolated and complete within ourselves by merging back into the real.
This is why the feminine only becomes possible through her prohibition.
The Greek myth of Persephone illustrates the Lacanian feminine and
desire. It often seems paradoxical to us modems that Persephone was both
the goddess of Spring and the queen of the dead.' From a Lacanian per-
spective, however, these two roles necessarily and inevitably go together.
58. See Lacan, Jouissance, supra note 16, at 137, 144-45; Rose, supra note 26, at 51.
59. GRosz, supra note 22, at 71-72.
60. Usually, scholars explain this paradox as a simplistic metaphor for the plants which
grow in Spring and die in Fall. This is overly simplistic, however. Unlike Persephone, the
same plant does not come back to life every year. Consequently, the plant metaphor accu-
rately describes the corn gods described by Sir James Frazer who are sacrificed every Fall,
but not Persephone. See generally SiR JAMES GEORGE FRAZER, THE GOLDEN BOUGH: A
STUDY IN MAGIC AND RELIGION (T.H. Gaster ed., abr. ed. 1951).
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Feminine enjoyment is simultaneously that which has not yet come and is
always already lost. It is the future and the past, but never the present.61
Once Persephone was called "Core," which is not a name, but merely
the generic term for "maiden."62 She was the virgin daughter of Demeter,
the goddess of the harvest. Demeter is the phallic mother as ripeness or
completion. Hades, the lord of the dead, abducted and raped Core so that
she would rule beside him on his infernal throne. Demeter refused to allow
anything to grow until Core was restored to her. In light of this threat, Zeus
was forced to intervene and ordered Hades to return Core.
Persephone's return was impossible. Core had eaten of the food of the
dead seven pomegranate seeds. She was no longer a core. Consequently,
although she was recalled to the upper world each Spring, she returned to
the underworld every Fall. The moment she was recalled to life, she was
immediately dying and leaving her mother's embrace to return to Hades.
But she used this pain to buy herself an inestimable present - subjectiv-
ity. Before her violation (castration) she had her virgin integrity and was as
one with the phallic mother in the perfect harmony of immediate relation-
ship. But this meant that she had no separate existence. She did not even
have a name. Like the imaginary feminine posited by "different voice"
feminism, as Core, she never fully separated from her mother. Now she is
Persephone, an individual speaking person. She is no longer overshadowed
by her mother, but neither is she passively raped by her husband. Try as he
might to hold her in his icy grasp, she was always slipping away to return
to life and the warmth of her mother's arms. As a subject, she is free and
sovereign. She is a queen, but by necessity a queen of death. Her very
name, Persephone, means "The Bringer of Destruction."
Persephone is obviously the personification of the seed who sprouts
from the earth in Spring and returns to the earth in Fall. Her perfection is
the fleeting momentary enjoyment or ripeness - union with her phallic
mother. But the moment she merges back with mother-ripeness, she no
longer exists because she once again loses her personality. She is, therefore,
even more dead when she is with the goddess of life who subsumes her, than
she is in the land of the dead, where she is merely imprisoned and can dream
of escape. Neither Demeter nor Hades succeed in embracing her, but now
worship her simultaneously as both the goddess of spring - the future
wholeness which is promised - and the queen of death - the past integrity
which can only be mourned.
61. I discuss this aspect of the Lacanian feminine extensively in Schroeder, supra note 8.
62. ROBERT GRAvES, THE GREEK MYTHS 89-96 (1955).
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Death seeks life, and life seeks death in the eternal, iterative sterility of
the fort-da game. Hades, the god of death, experiences his desire for
Persephone in the masculine form of Eros. He seeks to cure his castration
in the imaginary by finding a perfect mate who will make him whole by
perfectly filling his hole. Demeter, the goddess of life, experiences her
desire for Persephone in the feminine form of Thanatos. She nostalgically
longs to retreat back to the time before her violation into the undifferenti-
ated, impersonal integrity of the real - turning Persephone back into Core,
the perfect virgin who is the one with the perfect mother. From the stand-
point of Demeter and Hades, Persephone is like Eurydice, the feminine twice
lost.63 From Persephone's own impossible position, she is feminine subjec-
tivity finally found.
2. The Desire of the Market
If markets are erotic, the desire of law and economics ideal would, at
first blush, seem to be Eros. Although there are various definitions of
efficiency, they all share a belief that utility or wealth could be increased by
shifting objects to the higher valuing user. The masculine pretends that the
hole of castration could be healed if he could just acquire the perfect mate
or object through exchange with whom he could join in a perfect, immediate
relationship. The lawyer/economist believes that the inefficiencies of the
economy can be cured if each subject can obtain his desired object through
exchange. This is misleading. Eros always turns into Thanatos - the desire
to dissolve back into the real. If the masculine achieves his desire by obtain-
ing an immediate relationship with the feminine, he loses the separation of
castration which creates his subjectivity.
Law and economics scholars tend to use the word "perfect market" as
shorthand for the conditions under which the Coase Theorem is supposed to
63. LACAN, supra note 18, at 25. Orpheus desired Eurydice because he never had her.
He was fianed and widower, but never husband. The beautiful Eurydice died from a snake
bite at their wedding. Although Orpheus had lost Eurydice once through death, he could not
accept that she was forever lost and persisted in the impossible dream that she could again be
embraced. And so, Orpheus descended to the underworld in order to retrieve her.
Persephone, the queen of death, promised Orpheus that he could have Eurydice, but only
in the future. Eurydice would follow behind Orpheus as he climbed the long passage out of
Tartarus back to life but Orpheus was forbidden to turn back and look at her. Orpheus's
anticipation was stirred by the soft sound of footsteps following behind him. He finally could
not control himself and turned around to embrace his beloved. As he did so, as Persephone
warned, she was already gone. He only knew that she had been there from the trace of her
loss - the fading echo of her farewell. See Jeanne L. Schroeder, The End of the Market: A
Psychoanalysis of Law and Economics (1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Washing-
ton and Lee Law Review).
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be true." In his original article, Ronald Coase mentioned that the initial
allocation of legal entitlements is irrelevant in a world without transaction
costs.6 A perfect market is a world without transaction costs. The concepts
of transaction costs and the perfect market are briefly discussed below.6
The perfect market exists in the real. The real is that which can not be
captured in the symbolic or the imaginary. The real is the wholeness lost in
castration. Consequently, it is the collapse of all castrating distinctions of
time and space into an ideal, immediate uterine unity. The real is, therefore,
an event, not a process. It is the universe which must have existed before
the big bang, and may exist again after some hypothesized future big crunch.
The real is the perfect resolution of the subject-object, and the self-other,
distinctions. It is pure being without distinctions. And, as Hegel explained
in his Greater Logic,6' absolutely pure being is identical to absolutely pure
nothingness. The real is the person before subjectivity - which of course
is created by the big bang we call castration. There is no individual person-
ality in the real. There is no lack in the real, so there can be no desire.
Without individuality and without desire, not only is there no need for
speech, but speech is impossible: there is no one to speak, no one to speak
to, and nothing to speak about. As the Bible tells us: In the beginning, the
world was without form and void.6"
Similarly, the perfect market is a place with no costs. According to
self-proclaimed Coaseans, the initial legal regime is irrelevant only if all
misallocations (or inefficient allocations) of entitlements can be costiessly
corrected. In other words, they must be corrected instantaneously.
The perfect market is a place without time because "time spent" is a
"major factor '69 in price differentiation, and price differentiation is, by
definition, a market imperfection. From an economic standpoint, one of the
most important costs is time itself. The first thing one learns in any finance
course is the "time value of money" and the corresponding "money value of
time." A dollar tomorrow is worth less than a dollar today. All delays in
time must, therefore, be compensated. We call this "interest."
64. See generally R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
65. Id. at 19.
66. See Schroeder, supra note 63.
67. The work colloquially referred to by Hegelians as THE GREATER LOGIC has been
published in English under the title G.W.F. HEGEL, HEGEL'S SCIENCE OF LOGIC (A.U. Miller
trans., 1969). Hegel also wrote LESSER LOGIC, published in the U.S. under the confusingly
similar name G.W.F. HEGEL, HEGEL'S LOGIC (William Wallace trans., 1975). To avoid
confusion in texts I use colloquial names.
68. Genesis 1:2.
69. MICHA GISSER & PETER S. BARTH, BASIC ECONOMICS 41 (1970).
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It follows from the fact that there is no time in the perfect market, that
there can also be no space and no movement. All differences in geography
must be done away with because distance not only means transportation
costs, but necessarily results in differentiation between different producers
and their products.
In the perfect market, there are can be no distinctions between objects.
Product differentiation is an imperfection by definition.7" At the efficient
price, all objects are perfect substitutes for all other objects. The fact that
there are no differentiated mediating objects for persons to use to individuate
themselves implies that there can be no subjectivity in the perfect market.
This also turns out to be the case.
In the perfect market, there is not merely perfect, but complete informa-
tion - "free, complete, instantaneous and universally available."7  But this
requires that there be no individual subjectivity - there is no distinction
between persons. That is, many opponents of the Coase Theorem try to use
game theory to show that efficient reallocation of entitlements may not occur
if the parties can use strategic behavior - hiding their true desires, and true
valuations. From a Coasean point of view, if the ability to use strategic
behavior impedes reallocations, then strategic behavior is a transaction cost
by definition which cannot exist in the perfect market. There can be no
secrets. Consequently, in the truly perfect, each party in a market must
know everything in the mind of every other party in the market. There is no
reason to speak, because everything has already been said. In the words of
Robert Cooter, "Mhe type of disclosure and certification of intent required
by the perfect market destroys a player's freedom. "'
Indeed, the perfect market is totally unfree. Since all legal rights must
be clear and ambiguous, there is no room for the creation of legal rights.
Since every member of the market polices and monitors every other mem-
ber, the market is perfectly coercive. All information is public, so not only
the public-private distinction essential to liberalism, but the private individu-
ality necessary for differentiation among, and recognition by, persons
disappears. If everyone has perfect information about everyone else, then
there can be no surprises in the perfect market. All action must be pre-
ordained. Without freedom, there can be no individuality, no subjectivity.
In a perfect market, there are no transactions, no movement, no market
intercourse. Actual markets depend on information being imperfect, "costly,
70. Id. at 41.
71. James Boyle, A Theory of Law and lnformation: Copyright, Spleens, Blackmail, and
Insider Trading, 80 CAL. L. REv. 1414, 1443 (1992).
72. Robert Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 17 (1982).
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partial, and deliberately restricted in its availability. "73 By definition, in the
perfect market, all entitlements have always already flowed to the highest
valuing user. The exchange price of all entitlements equal the use value of
all users. The economic theory of marginalism holds that in the perfect
market exchange will continue until all subjects become perfectly indifferent
to all objects. There is no desire. Without desire, there is no exchange.
Once the perfect market is achieved, all markets stop. This is why we
cannot bear to confront the perfect market or describe it in law and lan-
guage. To achieve the perfect market is jouissance, the transgression of the
market, law, and language. To achieve the perfect market would be to
regress back to the state before the birth of subjectivity. The perfect market
is death. For the symbolic order of the actual market to work, the perfect
market must be forever postponed. It must be forbidden.
This is the Lacanian paradox of the feminine. The perfect market is the
real. It is the impossible realm where castration is cured - where nothing
is cut off from anything else. We desire the perfect market precisely because
we long for the perfect wholeness we feel we have lost. The perfect market,
like the dream of our own conception, is the image of the final attainment of
the phallus - ecstatic union with the phallic mother. But the achievement
of the perfect market, simultaneously makes the feminine - the negativity
necessary for human freedom - impossible. The real which is now lost was
only created by castration. The freedom which is the feminine only becomes
possible through her prohibition.
The desire of law and economics is wealth maximization - the desire
for money. The ancients knew that money is Juno Moneta - the feminine
who reminds and warns. She fills our memories with the image of lost
freedom, enabling us to desire future freedom. But she also warns us not to
give in to our desire because total freedom is total negation, our desire is
Thanatos. The feminine captured becomes Persephone - The Bringer of
Destruction. To fulfill your desire for the feminine is to lose both her and
yourself.
73. Boyle, supra note 71, at 1443.
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